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by 
Stephen A. Resnick 
Introduction 
This paper endeavors to accomplish two things: to offer an historical 
explanation for the possible emergence of a capitalistic mode of production 
in the development process; and to suggest how this ~arti~ular path has been 
constrained and moulded by the international economy. The argument presented 
is basically theoretical in nature but does attempt to transcend the somewhat 
narrow interpretation of development economics in terms of the dualistic 
and/or surplus models. There is a limit, however, to how far theoretical analy­
sis can go without careful presentation of empirical cases" The purpose of 
this paper is only to suggest certain key elements in a given country's economic 
history which might make it a candidate for the particular scenario described 
by the model. By so doing perhaps various special cases of capitalistic develop• 
ment may be understood as being part of a wider historical process. 
Are there any specific elements which suggest that in a given under­
developed country a capitc>.listic mode of production may be emerging? Three 
important factors need to be considered: 
1) The irnport··substi tut ion c-;: forced industrialization programs since 
World War II can be viewed as an attern?t by the government to create or fur­
ther the development of a class of private businessmen or entrepreneurs who 
will be willing to hold and mana6s industrial assets. 
1 This is what is meant 
by the emergence of a capitalistic mode of production, If this notion is 
accepted, then what historical factors were present which produced a class 
receptive to the various stimuli provided by the stat0? Connected with this 
is the further que;stion of whether the~l·e now exists elements of the class 
structure which tend to limit capitalistic development? Does the land lord 
class or "comprador" element form n possible barrier to capitalistic develop­
mant in a given underdeveloped cot.:ntry? 
2) Post-war iniustrial developmeat car.. be characi:erized by the emer-
gence on a national scale of the smn~ m1even development that was the out-
2 · +- • 1 1· ' 1 · s t an 1.ng t ure . previous 1.ncerna· ... iona.,_ Similard • f ea o......: the · co on1.a sysr:.::m, to 
what occurred under coloni1:11ic2, there has been a dee.peuing of capital, a rise 
in wages, and an expansion of m::.nu£actu:::ing emr,loyment for a few privileged 
workers while most of the population continues to live in poverty, especially 
in the rural ar';as. Historically; howe--re:-, the,~e two pe:ciods differ in that 
colonialism was marked by accumu:!.ation principally for the benefit of a foreign 
class while successful cc1pitali3t accumulation i!'.l the post~colonial world must 
involve the active p3rticipati:;n cf a national bourgeois classo In this sense, 
there is one rather than ·two distim:t ;,:,hases of capital accumulat:i.on but the 
agents of change hav~ b2en lf,cd:i_ f:i.ed, lf this :i..nte:rpr2tai:ion is nccepted, then 
again the question arises ,;once'.i'.'ning the ;:1ature of this bourgeois class, its 
source of wealth, and its particular relationship ':o the now independent state. 
For example, shou1.d cn'3 reg<:1rct industrial progress sin:::e the War and strategies 
used by the governmer.c .::.s c:mstituting an environment fovorsble to the creation 
of a capitalistic mode of pzod11ctio11'l En,,:; the eme·::ging bou:rgeois class been 
successful i::.1 seeking ne·.~ wA:r, of investing j_;:3 \vealth in ri.e,-J formi::, cf produc-
tion? 
.At this p.:iint, it 5.s usefo1. tc- cL.stingu1.sh between .,,hat Marx referred 
~ . . 1· 3t o as t wo pa th s co cap1.cs 1.sm, and to raise the questi.on of which path might 
appropriately describe the l::ransitio:-1 ~:') c.::1f,i ta lL,m in certai:1 underdeveloped 
countries. Is the development pattern observed similiar to what historically 
occurred in the United Kingdom where, according to Marx, "the producer becomes 
merchant and capitalist" and His the really revolutionizing path;" or is it 
closer to the second path where elements of the merchant class become capi­
talists?4 This paper suggests that the economic experience of certain under­
developed countries conforms to the second route or merchant to manufacturer 
path rather than to the English (or West European) modeL A problem arises, 
however, in that Marx referred to this second path as being non-revolutionary 
in that the merchant class became eventu.slly 11 an obstacle to the real capitalist 
mode of production and goes under with its develorment,, 115 What are the socio­
economic conditions then ,;,:ihich tend to ;nake this process culminate in a 
capitalistic mode? In particular, what is the relationship between the agrarian 
and industrial sectors and how does this determine the characteristics of 
capitalistic development? '£his brings us to our third important element. 
3) The government or state in an underdeveloped country plays a crucial 
role in fostering the accumulation of capital and correspondingly the develop­
ment of capitalistso Once again the contrast between the colonial and post­
colonial periods becomes crucial for the analysis. Whereas government activity 
under colonial rule was mostly directed to investment in export-biased infra­
structure, the "big push1' once independence was gained is to be found in ex­
penditures on education, roads, power or, in general, upon industry-biased 
infrastructure. By using various instruments, especially that of protection 
of domestic industry_, the state has attempted to raise the price received by 
the capitalist class for his output and/or lo,,Jer the price for his input. As 
noted this has led to uneven development,. It is almost as if an 1'internal 
colonial polici' was followed wheTe industry exploitE:d agriculture and led, as 
will be seen., to an alliance of ::he i:apitalist and landlord classes and to an 
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underdeveloped class of free peasants and workers. Equally important for the 
argument of this paper is an attempt by the government to gain a degree of 
independence from foreign capital for the development of a national bourgeois 
class. Here the crucial question concerns the role of the multinational cor­
porations as a possible barrier to the growth of an indigenous capitalist 
class. The resolution of this conflict willJ in fact, have much to do with 
determining the type of process describedo For if control over the emerging 
industrial surplus is in the hands of foreign capitalists, then the national 
bourgoisie will turn out to be littla more than junior partners of international 
corporations based at the center, And this result would preclude the possi­
bility of capitalistic development as we have defined it. 
These three related points form the basis for the following discussion. 
We begin with colonialism for its history is an important key in understanding 
the complex processes that have occurred since World War II. 
Col~nialism 
From about 1870 to Worlc1. War II, international capitalism engendered a 
commercial revolution in much of the third world. The extension of the market 
led to a reallocation of resources from those activities linked to an agrarian 
6type of society to those associated with an expanding commercial economy. 
Production for international markets rather than for own use affected as well 
the relationship of the peasant to the landlord, the division of labor based 
on the family or village, and traditional tenure or property rights. The 
degree to which all of this occurred throughout the third world was, of course, 
uneven. Different types of colonial rule found in various areas together with 
different types of crops and associated techniques of production can be expected 
to produce several forms of resultso Furthermore, many countries were marked 
by regional differences such that the econorrdc history of a region was not 
that of the country as a whole" Nonetheless, certain broad similarities seem 
to be evident among agrariau societies and their relationship to colonial or 
external forces, and specific differences may be easier to understand if the 
general model is understood. 
From the mid 19th century on, agriculture in the hinterland became in­
creasingly .a branch of world industry dominated by capital accumulation and 
capitals in the center. This was not the first time that increase inan 
commodity demand was known in the third worldo Some form of markets toseem 
have always existed as evidenced, for example, by the historic triangular trade 
among India, China, and Southeast Asia prior to the coming of the West. None­
theless, this trade does not seem to have been of quantitative importance and 
international markets remained underdeveloped in character" The great expan­
sion of trade after about 1850; however, was based on the social and economic 
circumstances brought about by the Industrial Revolution,, Technological inno­
vations based on capi.tal accumulation, general improvements in international 
transport and methods of cornmunicationsJ and the establishment of a financial 
center based on London--all tended to make capitalism a universal force 
thereby drawing the countries cf the third world into the development process 
and commercializing their land and agriculture. It is in this sense that 
Capitalism preceded the commercial transformation of the underdeveloped 
countries and made 2conomi c dependence ;:i universa l form,, 
The economic development of the agrarian sector implied increasingly 
the separation of the producer from owning his means of production and tended 
to undermine the traditional or agrarian life centered on the family and village. 
The extension of the market meant the production of surplus value rather than 
product as the internal division of labor based on a personalized agrarian 
society was replaced more and ~ore by the impersonal forces of international 
specialization and division of laboro Colonialism or external circumstances 
became then a primary social force in undermining the old agrarian structure 
and tended to bring labor power into being in much of the third world. His­
torically, colonialism in many areas of the world did not lead to underdevelop­
ment in the sense of making men independent of markets and exchange value; it 
began the development process by establishing the necessary infrastructure 
for the primary nccumulation of capita1 1 and for some countries, laid the founda­
tion for the transition to capitalism via the (second) route referred to pre-
viously. 
Is there then an evident pattern in a country's economic history which 
tends to explain why such a mode may develop? Although the extension of the 
market undermined the agrarian society, in some areas of the world or in some 
regions, capitalism seems to have harnessed a pre··capitalistic mode without 
7destroying the ties of the peasants to the soil. In fact, the labor services 
of the peasant to the indigenous landlord or foreign capitalist were, if any­
thing, reinforced, In other areas, the agrarian sector was truly transformed 
by the introduction of new investments snd social organizations but again there 
seems to be no agricultural revolution in the sense of producing a rising 
,. v " bourgeois from the ranks of petty producers or rarmers" In fact, the develop-
ment of the agrarian sector by capitalistic infh,.ences seems to have produced 
several different forms of social organizations and no single case of what 
might be calied a success.Eul boul'geois revolutiono One of the keys in under­
standing why one of these forms may result in the emergence of a capitalistic 
mode is to be found in the way one treats tte relationships among the peasants, 
the indigenous merchant classJ and the state" Where, for example, the landed 
classes did make a successful adjust,nent to the e1cternal market and where 
they formed a successful political coalition with the power of the colonial 
government, they then se,ved as a vehicle for the transition process. This 
implicitly assumes that this class or ita potential grcwth and development 
was not fragmented by colonial administration. Colonialism or e~:ternal events 
acts rather as the midwife for the developii,ent of commercial impulses among 
its ranks. 
It is the landed classes then or, from within its ranks, an emerging 
merchant class that tends to be the revolutionary agent rather than petty pro­
ducers in the vi 11.ages or townso Obviously not all landlords make this adjust­
ment and in this case they tend to become a barrier to further change. Nor 
does the transition pro~ess proceed smoothly for the political relationships re­
main tenuous in nature e-specia lly those with the foreign government. And in 
fact it takes a major international event that of World War II to shatter finally 
the magic of colonial power thereby allowing this class to make the necessary 
changes for industrial advances" 
Perhaps the most important relationship is between the peasants and the 
landlords. Although the agrarian s2ctor is being transformed, there does not 
seem to be a corresponding developm,.:nt of a fr2e anci independent class of 
peasants or petty bourgeois producers. Labor power is being produced in­
creasingly for the lord rather tha;.1 directly for the market economy and a wage­
labor system only slowly emerges (at times peculiar to certain crops and/or 
regions). Indeed, it is only after World War II when industrial capital tends 
to dominate that one can speak of the existence of a capital-labor system. 
The landed upper class is able to preserve if not strengthen its poli­
tical and economic podtion ,,bile extracting 2 marketable surph,s from the 
rural society. The essential point is that the commercial development of the 
country whether it directly or indirectly serves a foreign class leads to an 
intensification of the social relationships between the indigenous landlord 
class and the peasant sector. A fusion of interests emerges between this 
landed class and the state to maintain the oligarchic system while sufficient 
reforms or changes are introduced from above to generate a surplus that can be 
exported profitably. Correspondingly, a variety of political and traditional 
devices are used to tie the peasant to the land rather than relying upon a 
labor market to ensure the neces8ary work force for the growing export economy. 
The police power of the state together with the intensification of different 
types of tenure and pe0nage arrangements and the attempt to maintain tradi­
tional social relationship between peasant and lord serve to create a new 
equilibrium. Simultaneously,; external events act to reduce the autonomy of 
village life: fragment rural industry, and bring about increased specialization. 
Thus, the very rationalization of the eccnomic order under commercialization 
acts paradoxically to prese;:ve the dominance of the landed elite over the 
large peasant sector" At this point) a concrete example of this type of 
agrarian organization is provided. 
The Philippines provide a good case study of the type of historical 
process so far described. A v~gorous class has appeared within Filipino 
society whose economic interests are increasingly tied to industry rather than 
to agriculture. Yet, a capitalistic mode is emerging without the destruction 
of the historic base of peasant agriculturee. It is in this sense that there 
has never been an agrarian revolution in the Philippines. The character of 
Filipino capitalism is that it has been erected on the basis of an alliance 
between the larger merchant families and the ruling class of landlords, and 
the historic source for this relationship is to be found in colonial rule, 
first Spanish then American. 
What is important to an understanding of why capitalistic development 
may be viable within the Philippines is the realization that a relatively power­
ful native elite was initially formed under Spanish colonialism and further en­
couraged and strengthened under AmeTican rule" This class often having its 
initial source of wealth in agriculture under Spanish rule and then in mono­
polistic profits of agrarian induced manufacturing under American becomes 
responsive to the favorable :i.ndustrial environment treated by the new commercial 
policy of import substitution iJ the 1950's and 1960:s. The dominant position 
of the landlord class can be traced back to the type of pol:.i.tical and economic 
Hispanization experienced r.,Jhere the government confered special political 
privileges and rights to land holdings upon a small group of Filipinos in re-
9 
turn for their help in administrating the colony,, In fact, in land holdings 
there has been a continuity from early Spanish times to the present, and various 
forms of tenant farming and debt peonage have existed for centuries. lO 
The very class (and religious) system relied upon by Spain to govern 
produced a class Guite capable of mounting the first organized anti-colonial 
movement in Southeast Asia (1896)" The increased income and political power 
enjoyed by this class; once Spain seriously opened her colony to world trade, 
led paradoxically to the downfall of Spanish rule. For too long Spanish 
rulers had remained on the sidelines watching a kind of free play of economic 
forces among Filipinos and the relatively newer western interests (British 
11
and American foreign traders) attracted by profitable opportunities. And 
once (in the 1890's) the colonial government attempted to resist the pressures 
brought by the native elite fer continued economic if not social change, a con­
flict ensued. In a sense, SpaL7. had been tee, 11 successful11 in creating an 
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indigenous class of potential entrepreneurs; the Spanish tended to become an 
underdeveloped eJ_ite in their own developing colony. 
When the Americans arrived upon the scene, a responsive Filipino class 
was willing and able to take advantage of the increased market incentives soon 
to be opened to the colonyo American colonialism did little to disrupt the 
class structure inherited from Spaino The native elite was granted more or 
less political and economic p,Jwer over the economy as a fusion rather than a 
12
conflict of interests emerged between this class and the colonial government. 
The free trade an:angem8nts imposed by the Americans, especially 
between 1910 anc 1934, lead to increased agrarian specialization. This process 
actually dates back to 1870 when the Ph:Llippines had begun the transformation 
into an export economy. Resources were reallocated from producing mainly food 
crops to increased specialization in exports, e.g., sugar, abacca, tobacco, and 
then during American rule, copra and coconut oil. Various events tended to 
13
reflect this overall movement from 1870 to 1938. The economy became a net 
importer of rice as regions increasingly specialized in export crops according 
to their comparative advantagec As labor requirements in agriculture rose, 
its needs were met by the decline of labor-intensive rural industry which was 
more or less destroyed by 1938. Here foreign imports replaced home produced 
manufactures and this substitution was most dramatic in the growing importation 
of textile manufactures, 
The surplus generated from the gains~from-trade between the United 
States and her colony remained within the Philippines providing the basis for 
an induced industrial growth of agrarian related industries, some import­
substitution in manufactures, and for government investment in productive 
activities. Macro evidence suggests si.gni ficant agrarian and non··agrarian 
14expansion. The motivating force behind much of this growth was the emerging 
merchant-capitalist class whose origin can be found irl' the Spanish period and 
whose effectiveness is nurtured by American policy. In fact, it was often 
the case that the established landlord and new merchant class not only came 
from the same sugar provinces but they were the same people or members of the 
same family. And it was wealth based on land holdings concentrated in a 
small class of Filipinos that tended to domj_nate political power throughout 
. l 15Amer1.can ru e. 
The new trading opportunities imposed by the Americans did have pro­
found effects on Filipino society. Not only was there an intimate relationship 
between the growth of exports and the expansion of manufactures but it was 
during the period of rapidly g:cm,Jing exports that muci.1 of the change in 
agrarian organization_, government bureaucracy, and health and education ad-
16 
vancements took place. Thus, the growth of external trade had an important 
if not leading role in changing agricultural production and thereby relation­
ships within the agrarian society. It was as well the necessary catalyst for 
changes in the commercial life of the Philippines. 
What is to be stressed, however, is that these events were not inde­
pendent of changes in the structure of Fi. lipi no society,. Trade expansion of 
the colony first under Spanish th"m American rule was not the sole instrument 
producing the trandtion from an ag·rari.an to E; commerciel economy. Spanish 
colonialism and the cotmnercii,1- and s0cial policies of the fclJowing American 
rule provided the necessary environment for the eventual flourishing of a 
Filipino merchant-capitalist cl.ass., A class whose source of wealth was formed 
in the trading fortunes generatt:d by the export boorn. Thus to understand the 
development of Phi lippi-ne capitalism, one oust analyze c.grefully both the 
growth of the expo:r.t 8conomy and the ,:hanges l n the under lyircg ins ti tutiona 1 
or class structt!re. The int::-::·actio11 among pe.1s2nts, landlords, and the govern-
ment bureaucracy provides the essential social ;nd political framework within 
which the story of the export economy can be told and an.a lyzed. 'What ·was 
necessary was that the cacique class produced under Spanish colonialism became 
the merchant capitalists under Ameri~an colonialism and then manufacturing 
capitalists under the protection policies of the 19501 s and 1960 1 s. 
One needs to be ca~eful to distinguish between the emergence of a 
merchant-capitalist class and the introducticn of a new sector that of manufac­
turing. The mode of production in the pre-war Philippine economy was not capi­
talistic in the sense of private entrepreneurs owning and managing industrial 
assetso This complex awaits the 19501 s and 19601 s. What is implied by the 
colonial period is the initial beginnings of industrialization as the merchant­
capitalists begins to transform the 2gricultural surplus into both agrarian re­
lated manufacturing such as sugar and rice mi 'i.ling and non-related industry 
1 ., 
such as printing_, saw~mi lling, and cemento ~, The source of wealth remains 
agriculture and in some sense the new me:rchant~[;apitali.st is the dual of the 
landlord who is inclined both to agriculture and industry,. Given the structure 
of Philippine society, it is diffi,~ult to ,:~is.:inguish bet,;.;een them in any 
meaningful sense. Nonetheless, whatever name 1:me wishes to provide, the rele­
vant point concerns their oehavj_or in the gene·cation of a surplus and its 
effective use. 
Even though cc:nme'l'.'cial influences were permeating rural life, the 
attachment of the peasant to the soil an<l the relationships between lord and 
peasant were intensified rather than weakenedo Althcugh the agricultural 
sector became relatively less important than manufacturing as a contributor 
to national product between 1902 and 1.93f>, the relative size of the labor force 
. . lt . . · 1 t d · 1 t h d · d 1 · lB1.n agr1.cu ure vis~a~v1.s non-agricu ...ure 1.u no s ow a correspon 1.ng ec 1.ne. 
Agriculture remained the major source of employrr,2nt ·while the Philippine economy 
was transformed from an agra:ria:1 i.:c a semi=.i. :-,.dustrial count'l'.'y 0 
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Within the agrarian sector, rice output more or less expanded to meet 
population growth and the importation of rice declined monotonically from 
1902 to 1938. Export production expande;d dramati.cally from 1910 to about 1934. 
Rural industry especially that of rice and sugar milling was replaced by or­
ganized manufacturing with a much higher productivityo This was especially 
true in the case of sugar processing" ~he labor thus released from very labor 
intensive rural industries flowed into agra:cian activities but mostly rice 
production given the more capital intensive nature of export (mainly sugar) 
. . R" d . b - - b . . 19cu1tivation. ice pro uction ecame then more la or inte~sive. 
The power of the landlord over the peasant was reflected in a variety 
of ways. As the upper c:i.ass turned incJ;",;asingly to the ma1·ket econollo/, the 
owner:ship of land became more important as a factor of production than as a 
traditional symbol of prestig,c:,, Peasants who either haJ. legally owned their 
land or, more likely; who had been farming iand thought to be their own soon 
found thems31ves in a tenant relationship whe,~e up to 50 ?ercent of the crop 
went to the lordc. And as in many agra-ci.an societies, debt peonage was a well 
known characteristic or rural life~ Historically, these re.nts seem to be 
relatively constant based more on custor;, and tradition than on any estimate 
of the implicit shadow rental of landn When tradition came under pressure, 
there was recourse to private armies by the landed elite. 
Peasant life remained, therefore, closely linked to ti.1is dominant 
class. Tenure arrangement1; far from declining under commercial development 
steadily increased from 1902 to 1938c. Those regions in which growth of an 
agricultural surplus was most pronounced were the same in which the rate of 
increase in tenancy was highest, The rice and sugar lcrds were able to extend 
labor services and, on the basis of the tax_. squeeze a aurplus out of the 
peasants to support their position. And it was a portion of this surplus 
that was financing the expansion of the non-agricultural sector .. 
~ Emergence_. of a Cap~s!-i,S~Mode o~,£Q,!! 
The weakness of the center as reflected by the depression of the 1930' s 
and the world war of the early 19ti.01 s ushered in a new political and economic 
era for many countries of the third worldc 'l'he ideology of national indepen­
dence and the organization of industry we::·e cleal'ly at the heart of the 
change. One of the most important characteristics of the post war period was 
the attempt of the government to manufacture a class of businessmen or capi­
talists who would be able and willing to hold and accumvlate industrial assets. 
This has been a long and costly process and the c,Jntradicticns of the involved 
policies are as well known as the successes, Nonetheless, where colonialism 
or foreign influence did not frustrate the development of a native bourgeois 
class, the post~war invt;stment in capitalist learning has tended to result in 
the emergence of a capitalist mode of production. As just argued, the.. 
Philippines would be such a cssee 
. , . 1· . 20The government promoted 1nuustr1.a izat1.on 1.n. severa 1 ways. The most 
obvious example was provided by its investment in social infrastructure; power 
plants to feed industry; roads and comnmnication systems to break down inter­
nal barriers to trade and create new channels for information to be diffused; 
and education to train a w::,rk force to hc1ve the necessary attributes and dis­
cipline for factory worko Equally important was the government's role in 
stimulating industry by protectionist policies or what has now become known 
as import-substitution programs, These various activities of the state are 
no doubt a product of the so~iety at a r.::ertain stage of its 2conomic develop­
mento For many developing ,~ountries, however, government action of one form 
or another has had a long trad.itiono Moreover,, the economic experience of 
developed countries has p1:oduced a stock of rather sophisticated techniques 
of state management and control upun which the latencomer government can draw. 
There are good his tori ca 1 :~ea sons then 'Which make government action so 
characteristic of our era., 
Yet, the government may be forced to a~t as an engine of capitalist 
development because of the particular devP-lopment process experienced. It is 
quite possible that the so~called second path to capitali2m would not be a 
viable route if the nativ2 merchant capitalists, p::oduced 1:>y commercialization, 
could not direct government expenditures i::o their own neGds nnd uses. The 
coalition bet·eveen the landed and indust1:ial eliL, requires a strong state not 
only to promote th2 economic interests of chis •~lass (by creat~_ng an environ­
ment favorable to the accuraulat:"on of capital) but also to preserve its poli­
tical position over the lE::cge peasant sect::ir and newly emerging industrial 
labor classo A capit2listic mode is establishr::d without destroying the old 
political ordero And state policy 5_s used to maintain this structure especially 
by keeping rural and urban workers in place while encouraging the capitalist 
to get on with his business of accumulationo 
This process is, of course, neither smooth nor potentially very stable. 
The very coalition between landlord and industrialist increasingly comes under 
pressure as the latter group inevitably gc::ins more economic and therefore 
political powerc It is true that the bourgeois we:::-e associateci with the landed 
elite from the beginning of colon:L:ilisrn (ac ~-n the: Philippines), ot· were de­
rived from the same farn:i.lyJ but ove-.:: time one would expect newer elements to 
appear who might threaten the; old equi lib:.·ium,, The rise of new industries, 
for example.. may imply new cour-::es of cap:i.tal:Lst power,. In addition, the 
emerging urban p1.-ofest:-Jonal ciasses, oftf':n associ.:.1 ted with gov2rnm2nt employment, 
give rise to new needs and desireso Thus, the class system tends to change 
as some landlords become industrialists (and perhaps vice versa), new sources 
of capital and capitalists are formed in the cities 7 and with the heavy em­
phasis on industrialization1 there is a relatively quick emergence of an urban 
pro letaria to 
Nonetheless, the inherent contrac'.ictions of the st.t:ategies followed 
are perhaps more pronounced under this path to capitalism than the first, or 
"producer to capitalist11 rout2Q There is a basic unevenP.ess of development 
and its benefits v1hid1 produce the ever p:;:eser,.i: danger of revolt in the 
countryside, and create new possibilities o:!: unrest in the cities. A large 
peasant sector rem&ins intact whi lE:: landed weslt"!:l continues to be concentrated 
in a few hands. In the u:roan area, a manu±acturing sector dev~lops rapidly 
where a small group of privileged workers i.n well··organiz2d capital intensive 
establishments co-Axist wit}'. a larse body of poorly paid worke1·s i.n unorganized 
crafts and service establishments. The basic political and economic hegemony 
of the landed and capitalist class is not broken and_, as under colonial rule, 
a middle class in both the rural and urban areas ia undere2veloped and politi­
cally weak. The gap between rich and pco:r widens0 Thus the cc:>ntinued under­
development of th2 countryside and the generation of a new peasant strata in 
the cities pose the greatest inter.nal thre.:it to the coalition which forms the 
core of the political structure, In oth8r wcrds, the rate of return on the 
second path is relatively high so long as an alliance between :.:·ural and urban 
poor is prevented. 
The effect of government action and industrialization fall mostly on 
agriculture. Resourcess, food and labor_, :nust be :rea:'..loc;Jted from this sector 
to industry" Th1::: ovc-.call pt·otcctio,:1 affr.;,ded i:he indusrrial sector allows in 
turn profitable opportunities in ·which the agri.:::·c'.ltural surplus can be invested. 
,, 17·· 
The effective use of this surplus in one period further increases output there­
fore surplus in the next p2riodo This dynamic process depends on the wage 
rate, the level of technology, and the demand for the goods being produced. 
But the essence of the capitalistic route is that a class of private business­
men or entrepreneurs in whose hands th~ ownership of wealth has been historically 
concentrated must be willing to transfer relatively unproductive assets into 
. . dmeans pro uct1.on, . aims colonial rule 
foreign influence provided the basis or did not destroy the possibility for 
concentration of wealth in a landed .::incl merchar.o.t class, state policy after 
World War II was reshaped by this group to prcvide the profitable opportunities 
inducing the transfer of a portion of this wealth into industrial capital. 
This does not mean that a foreign class under colonial rule did not 
benefit from the exploitation of agricultureo Even in the Philippines, American 
investors had non·-negligib le interestr: in sugar processing and overriding 
22 
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c 1aims· on publ"ic uti· 1_i· ti· es and m1.ni· · ng, What is meant, however, is that 
landed wealth remained mainly in native hands and a significant share of the 
trading fortunes generated were held by local groups to make them visable as 
a relatively powerful class" Where an alien complex domi.nated agriculture 
23and/or the import-export trade, the above scenario would not be appropriate. 
Nonetheless, even in the case of the Philippines where evidence suggests that 
some merchant capital was directed to industry, widespread industrialization 
based on a capitalistic mode was not present~ Industrial wealth was located 
and owned by capitalists in the center while landed wealth was controlled by 
a sma 11 group of Fi. lipinoso And, as previously indicated: tl-~ere was a fusion 
rather than a conflict of interests between the two groups. Thus, the state­
ment made that accvmulation under colonialism was for the benefit of a foreign 
class means that or,ly this class was able to realize the benefil:s of trans­
ferring the gains-from~,trade into industrial capitaL 
Given then an enriched class of lords and merchants ·iJho have the means 
to invest, ,vhat incentives are provided inducing them to invest in industry? 
Various instruments=-tariff protection, subsidies, tax credits, infrastructure, 
the fostering of a banking and financial structure--are used to raise the in­
ternal price of goods the capitalist seUs whiJ_e attempting to maintain or 
lower the prices of his inputs. Basically, labo1-' is in plentiful supply from 
the agricultural sector anc- imported raw materials and capital equipment are 
priced below their oppo:cturd ty cost o:r less than what they 'Would have been 
21,,
under an equilibrium exchange rateo Easy access to scarce foreign exchange 
is provided once an import license is ohtair.ed and a premium is thus placed on 
the politics of businesso 
Ready access to subsidized creJit and ta1~ benefits are provided which 
often permit investment in manufacturing with a minimum of equity and a maximum 
of borrowing. The fostering of a banking and financia 1 intermediary sector 
helps to provide capitalists with a high degree of individual security, i.e., 
portfolios weighted towards low-risk non-industrial securities, ·while encouraging 
investment in industry. In fact, to the sxteP.t that the government can provide 
a suitable financial structure, .sccumulation of industrial assets can proceed 
while satisfying the preference of wealth holders to include bonds and real 
25 . h . f 1·estate int eLr port o ios,. The bankj_ng system itself is often intimately 
associated with the class structure so that loans are arranged on the basis of 
family connections rather than on the impersona 1 mechanism of the market in­
terest rate. The supply of credit may be :restricted to the economy as a whole 
but this does not necessarily mean that it is an operating constraint for all 
of its members. A well pla-:ed phone call is often more important in obtaining 
back credit than a balance sheeto 
In summary, thenJ the pattern of conce;:itration of wea 1th is a legacy 
of the colonial past. Th 12 state under the program of import substitution pro­
vides the necessary eu.v:b:onment in which there is a profitable rate of return 
on manufactnringo And :::: financial system encourages the transfer of old wealth 
into new while creating the necessary a,,sets to satisfy the capitalist desires 
for portfolio balanceo 
To insure success for this process, c3rtain other conditions are re­
quired. Perhaps the most crucial is the ·relationship between town and country. 
Initially the effective detnand for. manufacturing output must be provided by 
the large agrarian sector, Inte:,:nal trade creation marks the post-war period 
as much as external trade di.d the p:,_-e-war yearso The mar2ufacturing sector de­
pends on the agrarian to furnish food and ce.:tain r'.:lW materials so as to prevent 
the internal terms of trade £:.:-om moving against j_ndustry, This economic 
balance between agriculture and ir,::1t1.st~y is matched by a political one. Not 
only is there a cheap supply of labor to industry but i:he capitalist relies 
on the landlord tc keep the peasants in line while generating an agricultural 
surpluso A portion of this su1·plus finds its way_, one way o:"." another, i.e., 
family or financial structure; into j_nclastry~ In return, the landed elite 
shares political power with the emergir.3 capitalist class. There is, as noted 
previously, a fusion of interests between the growing capitalist class and the 
landlords. 
The growth of internal trade impli2s a -wider divisj_on of labor and 
specialization throughout 211 sectors.. P.s the internal market for commodity 
production expands, so doc'.~ the m2:cket for lahor and th<::I7efore capital. A 
point is reached -where :Lnvestment in agriculture is essential to provide a 
,,. 
growing supply of food and labor to the expanding urban areaso The compromise 
or fusion between industrial and lnnded eHt2. comes under increasing pressure 
as capital tends to dominate both sectorJ thereby challenging much of the 
old agrarian social structure, In these. latter stages of development, it 
would not be surprising to find new agri~businesses develop. Investments--
fertilizers, irrigation_.. and farm equipment-~would ·::,e dire.;::ted ·co the agrarian 
sector usually to the benefit of the ld:rge:r farms which hc;ve better access to 
credit and management tech11iqueso The landlo1:·d becomes a capitalist farmer 
in his own right replacing the 8ervic0s of peasant labor with those of machines. 
The new technology of seed grains or 'iJhat L ..~ known as the green revolution 
saves on labor enriching the larger farms .:.md their owners and dispossessing 
numerous small farmerso In contrast to what occurred during che expansion 
of external trade (where peasant labor was -:::i.•2d to the soi 1) ,. labor is now re­
leased by the technological enclosures of the 1970' s. And the ranks of labor 
in the cities are f;Wolh:.n by individuals seeking employment. 
The very su.cces8 cf this type of capitalist development breeds certain 
contradictions which, as previOi..rnly noted, threaten the stability of the poli-
. l 26tica structure. The i:nport~- substitution policies lead to an i ni tia1 con-
centration of investment in an organized and protected manufacturing sector 
where there is a rising capital labor-ratio, productivity, and wages for a 
small group of workcrG~ The import dependent industrial structure buys a for­
eign technology that :Ls labor--saving anci the irnperfect:i..ons in factor markets 
result in excessive investmentG in consumer goods indust.cj_es to the neglect of 
intermediate and cdpital goods. An industrial structure emerges where the 
favored organized manufacturing se-::to1· .:..:o~exi sts with a large crafts and/or 
service sector where :nost of the urba·;1 pe0plr:i a,7'~ employedry The uneven income 
distribution reflects the dualism cf t~1is i.ndust1:i.c:lizatio11 0 
This structure is a result of the endeavor of the state to serve the 
interests of one group, the national capitalist class, not so much at the ex­
pense of the landed elite but rather at the cost of peasant and non-privileged 
urban workers in generaL Nonetheless.,· there is no reason to believe the 
story ends here. An arg'..!ment was just presen-::ed where, at the latter stages 
of development, capital would be directed to agriculture for political as much 
as economic reasonso If the state :i.s sophisticated enough to change its policy 
in such a way, then presumably it could also .nobilize the excess labor in the 
urban areas for the production of capital and intermediate goods. In fact, 
given the above seer.aria of a strong state contr01led by a relatively powerful 
elite, there are good political re::rnons why such a switch in policy could be 
expected. There are, however,. external proble£t1S which may make such a change 
difficult to accompli.sh~ 
The change in government activities after the war, the eme:i::-gence of an 
urban labor force., and the increased reJ.~.ance on internal trad2 have produced 
an industrial rather than, as unc'ier coJ.onialism~ a raw material surplus. A 
basic political question emerges of who will control it=-the national bour­
geois class or the capitaJ.ists of the center·? The latter are represented by 
large and powerful multinationa 1 corpo1~ations whose post·,.war interests have in-
creasingly turn2d to manufacturing investments in th·2 third ·woe ldo At one 
level the national anc:' foreign capitalist class have a similar objective: the 
continued growth of a1:1 industria 1 s9ctor,. At another level, how~ver, their 
objectives differ for tl:e capitalists of the cent.er operate in an international 
environment where a given underdevefoped c::mntry can only expect to become a 
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branch plant cou:1t:ry in which nationa 1 indep,2ndcnce would be erodedo Decisions 
over resource control, product mi.x and innovation, and corporate bureaucracy 
4' 
would remain at the center, As with any ruling group, there is no reason to 
believe that corporate directors would vote themselves out of power allowing 
the planning, directing, and control of corporate decisions to be made on a 
local level by local businessmeno 
The resolution of the c0nflict depends upon the relative bargaining 
power of the involved partieso One of the implications of the argument pre­
sented in this paper is that the :.1.ational bourgeois would have the necessary 
strength to remain in control of the manufacturing surplus generated. If an 
underdevelop1:;d country has experi,.::nced the particular development p.sth so far 
described,, then the gover:1ment would be able to bargain effectively with for­
eign capitalists thereby resisting the pressures of the multinational corpora­
tion to penetrate the. privileged position of the national bourgeois class. The 
continued development of this s:tass would thus be assured, and the con~entra­
tion of industrial wealth would not be diffused~ Direction and control of re­
sources would remain in local hands and the political coalition would continue 
to have the necessm:-y means to cry and keep the excludP.d groups in line. 
If, howe.ve:r., the developmen,: of the national bourgeois we:ce constrained 
by the economic and political p•3net:ration of multinational corporations, then 
a variety of possible political and corporate configurations co1_;ld result: 
an alliance between foreign and domsstic capitE,l ,,here different forms of 
joint ventures could b2 establ:i.sned; or foreign subsidiaries investing in key 
manufactur:i ng indust::·ies ;,;uch as cigri~buain~ss comple:;:es, pharmac,,ut.ics, or 
electronics; or e~1en ::i uni.on of ::.nten~sts between the landed tlite and the for­
eign capitalist to prevent the national bourgeois from gaining economic and 
political powero Whatever the form of social organization that might result 
and even though it may appear tha·i: a native business class was growing, the 
relationship would be uneven ~L,d political dependence would be the rule. 
Since the domestic bourgeoisie ·would not have major ccnt:rol ove:r. the growing 
industrial surplus, it could not be assured of controlling the politics of the 
country, and over time, its internal and external bargaining power would be 
progressively eroded., Political decisions would tend to eminate from the 
center necessarily implying the exiatencc of a relatively weak govern;nent in 
the hinter landc 
This scenario assumes, howeveI:, th.:it th(~ multinational corporation 
is powerful enough and wi 11 continue to be ao to make its presence felt in 
much of the c<;onomic .2nd political life of the u:.:1derdeveloped countryo There 
is reason to believe that new forces tr. the center and in the international 
economy wi 11 create di fficultie3 fo-;: the ;:;ontinued hegr.,mony of these corpora-
tionso New Eou7cccs o:f d.valry vJi.thin the capitalist block> the emergence of 
the Common Marke:~ and Japan to challenge t:1c AmcTican pos:~tio1.1) nr,_d the possi­
bility of obtaining loans .,:,nd p·cote:~tion from th::: socialist countries allow 
new degrees of m.:-rneuverabiH.ty fc:.: the uncc;:developed countryc C;,:ce again, 
howeve:c ;; the establishrn-2nt of a st,.·on:3 stat,~ would be required to adroitly 
balance the competing p:r.essures from each of thl-'!:1c blocks., 
Where a government is st·::-ong enou::;h to withstand the pressures from 
foreign capital., then pr.esumc:bly impcr,:ted skills sud technology could be used 
for the development of the country withou~: :cunning the danger that the country 
would be used for the b,:cnefit '.Jf a :foreign class., These :rec good econorrJ.c 
reasons ,,hy a de-~1eloping country mtght buy the ~:ki 11s ancl e:;~pertise of a 
developed country" ?'.)reign invectmznt:s ·::ould play an appreciab1'.":! role allowing 
the developing country to :Lrapo:rt the services of .s; foreign class, Nonetheless, 
for the pur~Josr:,::, of this pape!'.', the cru~ial question is not whethe1· the country 
as a -whcle bcn"::f:i.i:s o::- looses from foreign inv-":!s"..:mer.::_. bu·;: :r;;;tber whether the 
national bourgeoi3 claso benefiti, or koses. 
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